Hybridity, vacuity, and blockage: visions of chaos from anthropological theory, island Melanesia, and central Africa by Scott, Michael W
  
Michael W. Scott 
Hybridity, vacuity, and blockage: visions 
of chaos from anthropological theory, 
island Melanesia, and central Africa 
 
Article (Published version) 
(Refereed) 
 
Original citation: 
Scott, Michael W (2005) Hybridity, vacuity, and blockage: visions of chaos from anthropological 
theory, island Melanesia, and central Africa. Comparative studies in society and history, 47 (1). 
pp. 190-216. ISSN 0010-4175 
 DOI: 10.1017/S0010417505000083 
 
© 2005 Society for Comparative Study of Society and History 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/16511/ 
Available in LSE Research Online: August 2012 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
Hybridity, Vacuity, and Blockage:
Visions of Chaos from
Anthropological Theory, Island
Melanesia, and Central Africa
MICHAEL W. SCOTT
Department of Anthropology, London School of Economics 
and Political Science
This is the true eternal return, the eternal repetition of the fundamental rhythm of the
cosmos—its periodical destruction and re-creation.
———Eliade 1959:108
. . . there are contradictory tendencies always at work—on the one hand towards ho-
mogenization and on the other towards new distinctions. 
———Lévi-Strauss 1978:20
We all need histories, and their violent making and remaking is one consequence of the
kind of postcolonial space we inhabit. 
———Moore 1997:143
Marshall Sahlins (1996) argues that anthropology has been the bearer of a
“bourgeoisified” Judeo-Christian cosmology according to which an original
state of chaos, akin to the Hobbesian state of nature, gives way to the order of
society or the state. The central conundrum that this anthropology has sought
to explain is how fallen and needy individuals come together in cooperative or-
ganization. Sahlins furthermore contends that, by universalizing this problem-
atic as the key to interpreting human societies and social action, anthropology
has subverted its attempts at cross-cultural understanding. My aim in this pa-
per is to draw attention to a growing commitment within anthropology to a dif-
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ferent cosmological paradigm with an inverse structure. Today, the elevation of
ethnic and cultural hybridity as both an approximate return to primordial hu-
man unity and an emancipatory moral high ground renders socio-cultural dif-
ference at once the presumed telos of many social practices and a scandal to be
overcome. Whereas the older anthropological cosmology uncovered by Sahlins
posited progress from atomistic privation to social solidarity, this new cosmol-
ogy posits the politically motivated splintering of essential human unity by the
construction of ethnicity and culture. Although I iterate the caution that this
emergent paradigm too has the potential to reproduce itself as ethnography, I
emphasize as more important its promising and troubling potential to revalorize
anthropological thinking on cosmology. Specifically, ownership of the meta-
cosmology encoded in hybridity theory ought to prompt anthropologists to
question our recently acquired aversion to the idea that cosmologies inform hu-
man action. At the same time, however, we need to scrutinize our fascination
with hybridity for signs of an unintentionally Nietzschean glorification of dis-
solution or aestheticization of periodic destruction as the necessary foundation
for political and moral renovation.1
Unlike the older anthropological cosmology analyzed by Sahlins, the current
one to which I refer has been developed by academics from diverse and mixed
intellectual and cultural backgrounds, some of whom point out that all anthro-
pologists embody what I take to be the key metaphor of this cosmology: hy-
bridity (Moore 1997:131–34).2 Many of the themes and arguments in which I
discern this latent cosmology are by now familiar. They are legible in the dis-
courses on modernity and globalization, postmodernity, colonialism, postcolo-
niality, the social construction of space, and the critique of the culture concept.
Drawing on the work of some of the most widely cited authors on these subjects,
I argue that these discourses promote the metaphor of hybridity as representa-
tive of a universal default condition of chaos, understood in the limited sense of
a re-integrative confusion of categories. Over against this particular model of
chaos, diverse forms of socio-cultural practice are found to be incomplete and
impermanent efforts toward differentiation, classification, and hierarchization.3
The narratives and values embedded in these discourses furthermore paral-
lel those found in two structurally analogous but morally inverse mythic mod-
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1 Although contributors to the cosmology I am describing regularly indict Romanticism as the
source of the morally suspect culture concept, the cosmology they implicitly construct entails new
versions, not only of the Romantic (or at least Rousseauean) theme of a naturally free and happy
humanity constrained and corrupted by civilization, but also of the theme of an antinomian, even
violent, impulse toward dissolution into elemental forces (on these themes see Berlin 1999).
2 Accordingly, unlike Sahlins, I do not attempt to identify a particular religious or philosophi-
cal tradition behind the new cosmology. To do so would, in fact, be an essentializing endeavor.
Moreover, as indicated in notes 4 and 5, below, variations on the basic cosmological paradigm in
question are too widely attested for this trend in theory to be attributable to one tradition more
than another.
3 I am identifying a general trend and do not intend to imply that every contribution to these dis-
courses displays this tendency.
els of cosmogony. Critics of regimes of difference often follow a logic compa-
rable to that of emanationist cosmogonies: they value chaos, figured as an orig-
inal undivided whole, positively, but value order, seen as dependent on frag-
mentation, negatively.4 Accordingly, these critiques tend to privilege processes
of hybridization that erode socio-cultural differences and approximate a return
to underlying human unity. But they also regularly present these same re-blend-
ing processes as conducive to new forms of segmentation. At the same time,
analysts that read regimes of difference as attempts to classify, rationalize, and
control describe a logic comparable to that of dismemberment cosmogonies:
the social agents analyzed are found to value the categories they construct pos-
itively as the means to order, but value the lack or breakdown of such rational-
izations negatively as chaotic confusion to be kept at bay by constant category
maintenance.5 Accordingly, such analyses often represent the practices under
study as schemes of repartition and recalibration necessitated by the intolera-
ble inroads of hybridization. Clearly, these are two sides of the same coin. The
relative moral values assigned to chaos and order may invert according to the
point of view of the analyst or the outlook imputed to the agents analyzed, but
the structure is constant: there is an ongoing oscillation between differentiation
and integration.
After excavating this cyclical paradigm from recent anthropological theo-
rizing, I compare two ethnographic examples in order to demonstrate why it is
important to bring this paradigm to the surface and identify it as a cosmologi-
cal one. The first example stems from my own field research on conflicting ma-
trilineal identities and land claims among the Arosi of Makira, Solomon Islands.
The second, dependent on the work of Arjun Appadurai and Christopher Tay-
lor, pertains to the late twentieth-century ethnic violence in Burundi and Rwan-
da. Through these examples, I explore the relationship between cosmology at
the meta-level of theory and cosmologies “in flux” (Appadurai 1998:231) in
ethnographic situations.
Appadurai (1996:180) suggests that to characterize particular practices as
cosmological is to “create the dubious impression of mechanical reproduction.”
Despite such hostility to cosmology, present-day social scientific discourses are
not innocent of similar deterministic tendencies, originating at the level of the-
ory as meta-cosmology.6 Bearing the latent claim that human beings every-
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4 Myths of emanation depict the universe as coming into being through processes of sponta-
neous differentiation within an original unity that contains all things in potentia. Examples of this
model are widespread and include the Hawaiian Kumulipo (Valeri 1985:215), some Hindu myths
of ultimate origins (Smith 1989:54–69), and a variety of pre-Socratic, neo-Platonic, and Gnostic
philosophies.
5 Myths of cosmogonic dismemberment depict the universe as coming into being through the
violent death and division of a primordial sacrifice, the body of which provides the materials from
which the cosmos is constructed. Examples include the Babylonian Enuma Elish and the Vedic
myth of Purus
·
a (Lincoln 1986; Valeri 1995).
6 Although some anthropologists continue to find cosmology a useful concept (e.g., Feuchtwang
where make order out of chaos by first creating and then reaffirming differ-
ences, contemporary anthropological theory is no less—and no more—mech-
anistic a template through which to view human agency than any other cosmo-
logical system. Although some would see this as a delegitimating flaw in
current theory, I argue instead that, as structures that inform human agency, the
universal impetus to order identified in anthropological meta-cosmology and
the visions of chaos and order production embedded in particular cosmologies
should be analyzed together in the hermeneutics of practice. As my ethno-
graphic examples show, however, such a methodology reveals the need to
destabilize hybridity, or any preconceived image, as the regnant model of what
constitutes chaos. Whereas the meta-cosmology of theory posits that all people
seek to impose ordering distinctions on chaos—understood exclusively as in-
sufficient differentiation—attention to the cosmologies in flux in lived situa-
tions indicates that not all people conceptualize chaos in terms of the absence
or admixture of categories. This means broadening our received notions of what
chaos might mean to accommodate any possible vision of what preceded or is
antithetical to proper order. Once this general and open-ended definition of
chaos is granted, comparative study shows that visions of chaos other than con-
fusion entail methods of order production other than the marking of difference.
Thus, for Arosi, chaos—the condition inimical to order—takes the form of so-
cially and morally evacuated space that provokes conflicting reordering acts of
matrilineal emplacement. In Burundi and Rwanda, however, it appears that a
condition opposite to order can take the form of “blocked beings” that must be
purged from the body politic. What is required analytically, then, is a nexus be-
tween the universal impulse to order and the particular understandings of chaos
that can inform the practical manifestations of that impulse. I conclude, there-
fore, with a proposal for developing a pluralized notion of chaos as a potentially
productive comparative category for anthropological theorizing and ethno-
graphic analysis.
chaos as hybridity and the production of difference 
in anthropological cosmology
A defining feature of the cosmology implicit in much of current anthropologi-
cal theory is a tendency to highlight and even celebrate hybridity in ways that
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2004; Gow 2001; Herzfeld 1992; Kapferer 1997), ethnographic analyses of praxis that appeal to
cosmology increasingly risk critique as cultural determinism. This stigmatization of cosmology is
traceable, in part, to criticisms of Sahlins’ interpretations of colonial history in Hawaii, but is also
bound up with the larger critique of the culture concept (e.g., Kuper 1999). Regarded as culture or
structure by another name, cosmology can be cast as an intellectualist, objectivist, mechanistic con-
struct that over-systematizes local knowledge and robs people of agency. Thus, Taylor, writing a
chapter entitled “The Cosmology of Terror” in which he argues that “something cultural happened”
in Rwanda, devotes four pages to preemptive deflection of such criticisms (1999:99–102; cf.
Kapferer 1997:19), and the Comaroffs (1991:152) distance themselves from the term with invert-
ed commas.
render this condition comparable to a return to the generative state of chaos, en-
visioned as the plenitude of primordial unity (cf. Friedman 2002:131). This fea-
ture is most apparent in discussions of how multiple processes and phenome-
na, such as greater and accelerated mobility, transnational communities and
commerce, and the technologies of mass communication, combine to erode
spatial, political, and social boundaries while expanding imagined possibilities
for identity production and relationships. The globalizing era is one in which
the formerly naturalized limits of nations, cultures, and ethnicities have become
blurred under forms and spaces of hybridity, flux, liminality, and uncertainty.
This is to say that we live increasingly in a state of chaos, understood as the re-
combination of the constituent elements of order within a new creative vortex
(cf. Brightman 1995:517, 540; Friedman 1999:2–3).7
Concretizing this hybridity, anthropologists are privileging interstitial zones
of migration, displacement, and deterritorialization—such as roads, border-
lands, and contested spaces—not only as revelatory sites for ethnographic in-
quiry, but as emblematic of the liminality of the globalizing, postmodern, or
postcolonial condition (Ballinger 2004:31; Gupta and Ferguson 1997:48; cf.
Aggarwal 2001; Clifford 1997; Hernández 2001; Masquelier 2002; Thomas
2002). As the matrix of new formations, the chaotic hybridity that these tropes
spatialize is deeply ambivalent, however. For many thinkers (Abu-Lughod
1991; Bhabha 1989; Gupta and Ferguson 1997:47–50; Young 1995:22–25), the
figurative borderland where dichotomies between Self and Other disintegrate
provides the standpoint for prophetic critique of old orders and the subversion
of inequalities; whereas, for Appadurai (1998), uncertain boundaries between
ethnic identities become the likely sites of “vivisectionist violence” as a means
of identity and order reconfiguration.
Although some theorists suggest that the present contingency, permeability,
and overlap of spaces and subjectivities constitutes something new, many tend
also to normalize chaotic confusion as a more or less permanent feature of hu-
man history. The present hybridity is thus “business as usual, only more so”
(Moore 1997:141): an acute intensification of the hybridity that has always re-
sulted from “the historical processes of a socially and spatially interconnected
world” (Gupta and Ferguson 1997:45). Once recognized as constant, these
processes reveal the “assumed isomorphism of space, place, and culture” to
have been a “fiction” (Gupta and Ferguson 1997:34). Cultures, furthermore,
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7 I am not claiming that anthropologists have explicitly defined hybridity as chaos; neverthe-
less, I find support for my analysis that current anthropological theory entails a cyclical cosmolo-
gy according to which the postcolonial or globalizing era constitutes the return of a chaos-like con-
dition, often described as hybridity, in statements such as the following: “the chaos of the garage
sale . . . provides a precise image for the postcolonial situation where cultural artifacts flow be-
tween unlikely places, and nothing is sacred, permanent, or sealed off” (Rosaldo 1989:44); “De-
spite decolonization, certain destinies and identities seem fixed, while others seem chaotic, disor-
derly, unfixed” (Dirks 1992:23); “our current theories of cultural chaos are insufficiently
developed” (Appadurai 1996:47).
have never been discrete, homogenous, wholes; rather, the processes of socio-
spatial differentiation and the material and symbolic representations they pro-
duce are inherently aspirational, complex, and dynamic (see Brightman 1995).
It is easily overlooked, however, that to generalize relative degrees of chaot-
ic hybridity to all times and contexts is to posit a processual model of cultural
formation, erosion, and reformation. Even as incipient cultural configurations
emerge at multiple and shifting sites, they are ruptured by flows of intercon-
nection that, in turn, stimulate transformative redefinitions. This processual
model, I submit, entails a cosmological paradigm according to which an origi-
nal state of chaos, understood as unbroken human unity, gives rise to projects
of order production, understood as projects of socio-cultural differentiation.
The central conundrum that an anthropology informed by this cosmology
seeks to explain is how the ontologically unitary category Homo sapiens seg-
ments itself into “a difference-producing set of relations” (Gupta and Ferguson
1997:46).
Formulated as a reaction against a supposed anthropological “premise of
discontinuity” that views ethnographic others as “preexisting ontological en-
tit[ies]” (Gupta and Ferguson 1997:33, 44), this cosmology reaffirms universal
humanity as the necessary moral and intellectual starting point for anthropo-
logical inquiry.8 Less obvious, however, are the ways in which the processual
model described above can position this clearly non-negotiable premise with-
in unacknowledged value-laden mythic scenarios. With respect to the critique
of the culture concept, Sahlins (2000:162) identifies what he terms a “pseudo-
history of the original-sin variety” according to which “culture” was, in Dirks’
words, “invented” as a tool of Western colonial discrimination and domination
(1992:3). Similarly, I suggest, the processual model evident in anthropological
cosmology today evokes a vision of the development of socio-cultural varia-
tion as a kind of fall from unity and equality of the Tower of Babel or emana-
tionist variety. The necessary subtext to the pseudohistory of the colonial in-
vention of “culture” seems, in fact, to be an implicit myth of the primordial
invention of difference in an analogous primeval power struggle. This sub-
text surfaces when Dirks concedes that colonialism itself “can be seen as a cul-
tural formation” emerging from and reinforcing the “processes that spawned
nations in the first place” (1992:3). Such a back-step from colonial to earlier
European history is the first in an infinite regress to a primordial paradox: re-
lations of power and difference generate and presuppose one another. They
must be imagined as having come into being simultaneously when mythic an-
cestors first forged and wielded prototypes of the “cultural technologies” of
colonialism (Dirks 1992:3) to sacrifice human unity. But note how these myth-
ic “culture heroes” have become culture culprits, high priests of power who pre-
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8 For the disputable claim that anthropology has operated with a model of human races and cul-
tures as essentially distinct species, see, for example, Abu-Lughod 1991; Kuper 1999; Thomas
1994: ch. 3; Young 1995: ch. 2.
side over the dismemberment and hierarchical distribution of humanity. The
moral implications of this latent just-so-story are uncompromising: only the ar-
chitects of order, who almost always have blood on their hands, can ever find
it good.
This is a truly pessimistic view, not only of culture, but of difference at all.
Difference at almost every level is an illusion to be denaturalized as the super-
ficial yet scarring artifact of power relations. Difference is an offense to be de-
nied as ultimately unreal; but, as in emanationist views of the phenomenal
world, there is hope that the sufferings and injustices it brings may be mitigat-
ed through enlightened awareness of its unreality. It is this hope that animates
at least some of the turn to hybridity in anthropological theory. More than a
metaphor for the globalizing, postmodern, or postcolonial condition, hybridity
is embraced as the historical approximation of, and means of moral reconnec-
tion with, an ideal of human unity that lifts us “beyond ‘culture’” (Gupta and
Ferguson 1997:48) and unmasks all differences as constructed, negotiable, and
transient (but see Friedman 2003:25).
Key theorists of hybridity have, nevertheless, resisted the potential world-
rejecting or Gnostic implications of their negativity and sought a realist orien-
tation to the inequalities and structures of domination in which difference is im-
plicated. Avoiding the temptation to “sublate” hybridity “into some utopian
sense of liberation or return” (Bhabha 1989:67, in Gupta and Ferguson 1997:48;
cf. Bhabha 1994:38–39), and cautioning that postcolonial hybridity is not a
trope that “resolves or provides solutions” to the rhythms of coalescence and
re-division (Moore 1997:142), these theorists challenge anthropology to en-
gage with a world in which difference will always be with us. They take the role
of subversive trickster who speaks from the margins to question all projects that
rely on and reify difference, especially the master dichotomy between Self and
Other. Given the impossibility of permanent liberation from regimes of differ-
ence, hybridity reveals and promotes the mutability of all categories.
The flip-side to this normalization and ethical privileging of hybridity is the
acknowledgment that the fluidity of hybridity, however morally appealing, is
not practically sustainable. To the extent that hybridization is also homoge-
nization, it may induce reactionary re-differentiation in the forms of “regional-
ization, nationalism, retribalism, and reinforced or newly constructed ethnici-
ty” (Lewellen 2002:77). With the recognition of this dynamic, the formulation
of a universal human condition emerges: we cannot not differentiate. We can-
not eradicate our proclivity to make order out of chaos by constructing cate-
gories and prescribing relations among them. Surprisingly, in fact, despite its
development within the critical response to structuralism, the new anthropo-
logical cosmology promotes a view of human ontology that is consonant with
a central assertion of Lévi-Strauss. We make meaning by making order and or-
der by cognizing and associating categories, and it is because of this propensi-
ty to make order via opposition that, however many socio-cultural worlds col-
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lapse, new ones—aspirational, incomplete, multiplex, and competing—will be
constructed from selected old and new elements.
In sum, the cyclical cosmology written into current theory assumes that hu-
man agency is driven by a universal inclination to achieve order by precipitat-
ing categories out of a resurgent chaotic confusion for which hybridity has be-
come a typifying metaphor. The interpretation of actual histories and practices
in light of this meta-cosmology involves, therefore, a degree of cosmological
determinism: “history everywhere is actively made in a dialectic of order and
disorder, consensus and contest” (Comaroff and Comaroff 1991:18). But this
does not mean that history is ever, as Eliade (1954) claimed, abolished. Rather,
it suggests that we are constantly negotiating a cosmological transition from
chaos to order, and that—precisely because history interrupts and impedes our
progress—we continually modify the terms of this negotiation. As the follow-
ing ethnographic examples demonstrate, for anthropology, this means that the-
oretical acceptance of a universal impetus to order ought to redirect attention
to how this impetus is manifested under the particular forms of lived cosmolo-
gies. Such a renewed approach to the anthropology of cosmology argues that
persons are not prisoners of cosmological mandates; rather, cosmologies make
images and models available to persons engaged in the common human project
of making order out of chaos. Furthermore, such redirected attention to the ac-
tual ways in which people make order out of chaos soon discovers that this com-
mon human project is carried out with reference to multiple understandings of
what constitutes a condition contrary to order and what ordering activities most
effectively banish those particular visions of chaos.
chaos as vacuity and matrilineal place-making in arosi
A recent colonial and postcolonial history of broadening and proliferating in-
terconnections has intensified the normal chaotic hybridity of the Melanesian
context known as Arosi on the island of Makira.9 The island first entered Eu-
ropean awareness in 1568 with the arrival of the Spanish explorer Álvaro de
Mendaña, who named it San Cristoval. Following whalers and traders, Angli-
can missionaries arrived in the mid nineteenth century, regularly taking island
youths back to their school in New Zealand. Labor recruitment to Queensland
and Fiji between 1870 and 1911 also placed Arosi people in new Pacific set-
tings from which they brought back a variety of foreign goods and new “con-
text-generative” (Appadurai 1996:182–88) ideas about their relationship to
other parts of the world. In 1893 Britain declared the Solomon Islands a Pro-
tectorate, and colonial administrators, together with Christian missionaries, in-
troduced sweeping changes that included pacification, socio-spatial reorgani-
zation, and the appointment of village headmen in lieu of ritually anointed
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9 The archaeological record of Pacific diasporas (see Spriggs 1997), as well as oral accounts of
inter-island exchange and marriage that I collected, reinforce a methodological presupposition that
precolonial Arosi took shape through extensive processes of migration and interconnection.
chiefs. These changes helped to localize “the Arosi” as a category of people
regulated in a place called Arosi (Fox 1924:3–5). Today the electoral districts
of Arosi I and II at the northwest end of Makira are nested within the larger
provincial and central political order of a nation-state independent since 1978
and known simply as Solomon Islands. Virtually every aspect of Arosi life has
been transformed: Arosi no longer speak, worship, dress, construct houses,
cultivate gardens, cook food, or organize communal work in the ways they
used to do.
In the midst of this compounded hybridity, many Arosi are negotiating what
Appadurai (1996:188) identifies as “the special problems that beset the pro-
duction of locality in a world that has become deterritorialized, diasporic, and
transnational.” Despite his concern that to cast the production of locality in
terms of cosmology is to mask its “active, intentional, and productive charac-
ter” (1996:180), Appadurai resorts to the language of chaos and order. He points
out that “neighborhoods”—lived social contexts—come into being, not only
vis-à-vis one another, but as projects of asserting “power over places and set-
tings that are viewed as potentially chaotic or rebellious” (1996:184). The pro-
duction of locality is, in fact, one of the most tangible registers in which peo-
ple strive to bring order out of chaos. Read in this way as cosmogonic,
techniques of locality production may be seen as valuable indicators of what
constitutes chaos in a given context. Although encompassed within the chaos
of postcolonial hybridity, the techniques of locality production prevalent in
Arosi today indicate that the vision of chaos to which these techniques most di-
rectly respond is not hybridity but semantically empty land. Depopulation and
deterritorialization have made coastal land in Arosi a virtual primordial land-
scape devoid of putatively autochthonous matrilineal landholders. Experienc-
ing this vacuity as both an obstacle and an incentive to the reproduction of their
locality, representatives of various Arosi matrilineages are emplacing them-
selves along the coast in irreconcilable ways.
Henrietta Moore (1999:16) has observed that, “however globalized and frag-
mented the contemporary world is or is said to be, individuals and collectivi-
ties still . . . remain committed to various projects and relationships.” Most peo-
ple, she reminds us, “remain in some relation to integratory concepts and
practices that help to make life meaningful.” With respect to Arosi, virtually all
adults clearly articulate what they hold to be the principles of Arosi socio-spa-
tial order, even though they aver that this “custom” (Solomon Islands Pijin: kas-
tom) is no longer practicable. Arosi teach their children that areas of land on
Makira are held by autochthonous matrilineages, known in Arosi as the auhen-
ua.10 Theoretically, only one matrilineage can be auhenua in any particular
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10 Although Arosi are familiar with the idea of private property, they have not adopted it. Rare
instances in which people have attempted to sell small parcels of matrilineal land or buy the few
small tracts of land previously taken by European planters have resulted in unresolved ambiguities
of ownership owing to the persistent privileging of matrilineal land tenure.
area. The matrilineages are exogamous, and the Arosi model of an ideal social
polity is a multi-lineal community gathered around representatives of an auhen-
ua matrilineage in its ancestral territory. This socio-spatial ideal is, furthermore,
associated with an ethical ideal incumbent on the auhenua in their land. As hosts
to in-marrying women, their children, and other strangers, members of the
auhenua matrilineage at the center of a polity should be gracious and generous.
This means promoting inter-lineage “entanglement” (haikawikawi) by permit-
ting non-lineage residents to use land for house construction and subsistence
gardening, granting access to fruit and nut trees, bestowing exclusively held lin-
eage personal names on non-lineage children, and contributing to feasts or oth-
er forms of exchange on behalf of such non-lineage persons. The auhenua
should foster what one man summed up as “love, peace, and unity.”
To sustain their auhenua-based polities, Arosi have always had to contend
with the “conditions of anxiety, entropy, social wear and flux, ecological un-
certainty and cosmic volatility” that are everywhere inimical to the repro-
duction of locality (Appadurai 1996:181, 185; cf. Scott 2000:65 – 66). For
example, because women usually go to reside and raise children where their
husbands are living, matrilineages must work to bring the children back to their
ancestral land to perpetuate their unique lineage-cum-land identities as social
magnets. Drawing a contrast between “olden times” (‘oha bwani) and the pre-
sent, Arosi say that chiefs, specially anointed to represent the auhenua, formerly
served to recruit the auhenua back to their land and mediate the integration of
others within their orbit. But beyond the loss of these chiefs, which Arosi spec-
ulate has undermined their ability to live together in clearly grounded polities,
three additional concomitants of colonialism—depopulation, dislocation, and
the acceptance of Christianity—have compounded the normal chaos of hy-
bridity, and with it, the usual challenges to locality reproduction.
From the mid-nineteenth century, introduced diseases decimated many Arosi
villages (Scott 2001:85–91), and assertions that the auhenua matrilineage of a
given place is extinct are now common. Indeed, many Arosi told me that the
auhenua matrilineages of the coastal land had all been wiped out in these epi-
demics. Partly in response to this crisis of disease and depopulation, mission-
aries and Protectorate officials encouraged the resettlement of Arosi living in
the bush to the coast in the early twentieth century. Narratives of this period 
of relocation inform a current Arosi discourse through which many people on
the coast describe themselves—but more frequently their neighbors—as sae
boboi, “people who have come from elsewhere.” Arosi Anglican Christianity
has furthermore rendered attitudes toward the physical markers of matrilineal
connection to land highly ambivalent. Although Arosi no longer sacrifice at the
ossuaries and ancestral shrines known as hera, or at the spirit-shark shrines
known as birubiru, these sacred sites, collectively designated dora maea, re-
main as indices of unique auhenua identities in the land and as the loci of en-
during ancestral powers. Most Arosi assume that the spirits of the dead, called
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adaro, are still present and potentially dangerous at several types of dora maea,
regardless of whether Christian exorcisms have been performed at them. Sev-
eral of my consultants vividly likened the spirits resident at hera and other such
sites to a radar system: adaro observe everyone in the vicinity and protect those
whom they recognize as their descendents but punish unknown interlopers.11
Owing to differing ideas regarding the relationship between the Christian God
and the agency of adaro, however, the degree and manner in which adaro con-
tinue to influence events is subject to differing Arosi interpretations. There are
even a few people who condemn the reckoning of relationship to land through
dora maea as “arguing from the time of darkness,” the time before Christianity
(cf. White 1991).
These interdependent influences have fostered a general uncertainty among
Arosi regarding the history and nature of the coastal land where nearly every-
one is now concentrated. Many acknowledge that they know neither which ma-
trilineages established local shrines nor the names of the dead placed in the hera
that still punctuate the coast. After disturbing one such ossuary, one young man
told me: “I had a dream after visiting that hera. I didn’t sleep well. I dreamt that
someone was coming toward me with a strong light like a flashlight. Then I
woke up.” This dream captures the ambivalence many Arosi feel about their re-
lationship to the places where they live. They endow the land with keen eyes
that scrutinize them, as if under an intense beam of light, but they may not know
who sees them and whether they have been seen as a relative or a stranger.
Moreover, villages, which comprise up to 550 people, cannot be assumed to
subsist within the territories of recognizable auhenua matrilineages. Instead,
when Arosi males explain their relationship to the places where they and their
families live, garden, or collect naturally occurring foods, they regularly say
that they “eat through the father” (ngau suri ama), meaning that they enjoy sus-
tenance from a piece of land because that is where their fathers and grandfa-
thers previously lived and worked. In contrast, to “eat through the mother” is
to share prerogatives of land use where one’s matrilineage is auhenua. Many
Arosi explain the prevalence of eating through the father today with reference
to the extinction of the matrilineages that once were auhenua in the villages.
When one elderly man showed me where he gardened in the land above his vil-
lage, I inquired whether he had asked permission to garden there. “No,” he
replied, “whom would I ask? The auhenua lineage is dead. In this village we
are all people who have come.” On the surface of things, then, there is a con-
sensus that no one in the coastal villages could justifiably claim to be auhenua;
the land ostensibly lies empty of original landholding lineages.
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11 According to Arosi, adaro are not partial to matrilineal descendents only. Those who might
feel comfortable visiting an ancestral site would include the children of lineage males as well as
members of the matrilineage. However, after a number of generations, often said to be five, de-
scendents of lineage males are no longer thought to be related to the matrilineage. Such people are
likely to avoid going to the dora maea in question.
But just when the possibility of reproducing Arosi locality in terms of auhen-
ua-centered polities seems most remote, the ordinary ordering impetus to do so
has been enhanced by “contingencies of history, environment, and imagina-
tion” (Appadurai 1996:185) that have positioned Arosi within a wider inter-
contextuality. Specifically, Arosi anxiety that their current disposition on the
land is incoherent and superficial is exacerbated by fears that insecure coastal
land may be taken by outsiders or that an imagined diaspora of genuine coastal
auhenua may return to displace them. In 1896 the British Solomon Islands Pro-
tectorate introduced the category of “waste land,” defined as land “vacant by
reason of the extinction of the original native owners and their descendants”
(Allan 1957:37). Such land was presumed available for government requisition
and sale. Although this waste land policy terminated in 1912 (Bennett 2000:41–
42), some Arosi speculate that, in pursuit of development initiatives, the pre-
sent government may appropriate land deemed unencumbered by customary
owners. Thus, one man, formulating his understanding of the Protectorate gov-
ernment’s settlement of Tikopians east of Arosi in the 1960s, observed: “That’s
what happened at Wairaraha. The lineage of the land was finished and the land
was neglected, so the government took it and it became Tikopian land.” He rec-
ognized a possibility that this could happen in his village as well, because, as
he said, repeating the regular refrain, “we are all people who have come from
elsewhere.”12
Some Arosi additionally experience their coastal context as part of a global
context of dispersed Arosi matrilineages, representatives of which may return
to the island to assume their rightful places in the land. Several Arosi confided
to me their belief that women from their coastal villages had been taken away
to America and elsewhere, either by the explorer Mendaña or during the forced
labor recruitment of the nineteenth century. These women, they said, had mar-
ried and perpetuated the old coastal matrilineages abroad. The prospect of the
return of their descendants is, for some people, cause for concern. As one old-
er consultant put it: “If the lineage of the woman of our village who married at
America returns, what will we people of the village now say, we who have all
come [here]? In our custom there is nothing we could say.”
Given these added pressures to reproduce neighborhoods in terms of territo-
ries firmly occupied by auhenua matrilineages, it is not surprising that, despite
the apparent consensus that there are no extant coastal auhenua, many Arosi
matrilineages are working to emplace themselves as the auhenua of their lit-
toral villages with contradictory results. They are doing so unobtrusively, how-
hybridity, vacuity, and blockage 201
12 Hviding (1993) presents compelling reasons for thinking that representations of landholding
unilineal groups in Marovo Lagoon (Western Province, Solomon Islands) are recent “indigenous
essentialisms” formulated primarily for the consumption of outsiders. As I elucidate below, how-
ever, the primacy Arosi grant to matrilineal identity and connection to place is not only a central
value among Arosi themselves but is also integral to a historically engaged but culturally persistent
Arosi model of cosmogony as a constant process.
ever, inhibited from openly articulating their identity and land claims by the
ethical dimension of what it means to be auhenua. The expectation that the gen-
uine auhenua of a place should be open-handed also compels them to humili-
ty toward the dependent guests on their land and discourages unvarnished as-
sertions of auhenua identity and its prerogatives as incompatible with a true
auhenua nature. The current processes of coastal auhenua emplacement thus
came to my attention as lineage representatives secretly divulged to me ge-
nealogical narratives according to which their matrilineages alone were the
original autochthonous people where they resided.13 I quickly realized, more-
over, that different matrilineages were telling me different narratives involving
many of the same sacred sites and geographical spaces, making the present-day
Arosi coastline an example of what Foucault (1986:25) termed a “heterotopia,”
a context “capable of juxtaposing in a single real place several spaces, several
sites that are in themselves incompatible.” Constituted by diverse matrilineal
points of view on the same terrain, this heterotopia is the inadvertent result of
Arosi attempts to order the chaos of a socially depleted landscape through re-
newed relationships of mutual generation among matrilineages, places, and the
ancestral subjectivities said to inhabit them (Scott 2001).
For the most part, the dynamic of becoming auhenua along the coast today
impinges only on each matrilineage’s closely guarded narrative construction of
the landscape without altering the land or the disposition of objects within it.
Nevertheless, Arosi reported to me a few anomalous cases of conflict involv-
ing the surreptitious construction of new “ancestral” sites and the physical ma-
nipulation of existing shrines (cf. Guidieri 1980:63–64). These new or modi-
fied structures are the work of those seeking to convince others that the sites
are evidence of their long-term ancestral presence in the land. The portable
“shark stones” used in the construction of the shrines known as birubiru appear
to be especially susceptible to relocation, as all the incidents about which I
learned involved these carved rock forms. In fact, without ever pursuing the
matter in court, people complained to me that they could have pointed to evi-
dence of their lineage’s ancient presence in a particular area if interloping pre-
tenders had not absconded with elements of their ancestral shrines. Long-term
lack of resolution is typical of such accusations, which tend to remain at the lev-
el of grumbled grievances in the absence of proof.14
More typical than the physical manipulation and creation of new shrines is
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eages they represented, may have been to articulate these claims on behalf of the requisitely mod-
est auhenua. It occurs to me that some people may have been eager to repose their self-under-
standings with me in the hope that I would likewise express and validate their claims without their
having to do so. 
14 The ethic of the auhenua discussed above also contributes to a general reluctance to make the
open identity and land claims that a court hearing would demand. That said, although I was not
aware of any contemporaneous court hearings regarding land during my residence in Arosi, I
learned of a few exceptional cases from the past. 
the intangible process of incorporating existing shrines into lineage narratives.
One of the clearest examples of this narrative reformation of ancestral sites oc-
curs in an area of land that stretches along the Arosi coast for about seven kilo-
meters and extends up into the bush for about eight kilometers. Although the
extent of the land implicated varies among their accounts, three lineages are in-
dependently and inconspicuously emplacing themselves in this area in over-
lapping ways. Each narrative describes specific shrines that are also featured in
the other two narratives, but contextualizes these contested shrines within dif-
ferent multifocal systems. At the same time, each narrative populates the con-
tested shrines with different spirit-sharks and associates them with the deeds of
different ancestral figures. All of the lineages concerned additionally assume
the same lineage name, and each regards the others as upstart impostors. When
I interviewed them, representatives of each lineage made a point of divulging
and contradicting aspects of the other lineages’ narratives, of which they were
often partially aware, in order to alert me that their rivals were “telling lies.”
Understandably, therefore, all were concerned not to broadcast their narratives
outside their lineages, lest elements of their accounts be similarly used against
them. Accusations presented to me by each lineage about the others included:
that the others had come from distant places where they were known by other
names; that the interlopers had stolen elements of their shrines and narratives;
or, that “they were just telling stories” that were patently untrue.15
Along with shrine and narrative elements, lineage personal names are like-
wise amenable to assimilation by competing lineages. Each matrilineage recy-
cles an exclusive set of ancestral names, many of which have acquired the pow-
er to mediate agency respecting certain areas of lineage land. The name of an
ancestor who once lived at a locale becomes connected to that area, often be-
cause that ancestor is said to have established a shrine there or invested the place
with tabus. A child to whom the name of such an ancestor is reassigned literal-
ly “eats food on account of the name” (ngau suri marahu); he or she is em-
powered to make decisions about the area of land and nut trees that the deceased
namesake oversaw. By reusing their personal names, lineages ensure that liv-
ing people continue to look after all of the different areas and local powers that
constitute their territories. Often a child is given a name with a view to eventu-
ally bringing that child to live at the place associated with a namesake. There
is, however, no prohibition against bestowing lineage names on non-matrilin-
eal descendants, and Arosi have regularly followed this practice as a means of
activating a child’s affinities with a related matrilineage. This use of names to
build ties across matrilineages easily leads to dissension regarding the origin
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rative constructions of the land, not only at the piecemeal level of details regarding specific ances-
tral sites, but also at the level of the framing of whole lineage narratives. For strikingly similar forms
of intrigue via genealogical narrative in a very different cultural and political context, see Shryock
1997.
and ownership of particular names, and people sometimes bemoan that their
lineage has lost control of land due to naming: “Our old people named differ-
ent [i.e., non-lineage] people with our lineage’s personal names, and [now these
people] have taken our land.” But, a situation that members of one lineage char-
acterize as name theft, another portrays as the rightful return of a name to their
land.
Seeking to secure ties to coastal lands through naming, Arosi matrilineages
are making concerted efforts to recoup their personal names. This means of lin-
eage emplacement takes two forms: conservation and premature distribution of
names. Fearing that others will appropriate their names, lineages increasingly
“hold firmly” (dau babau) onto those names that are not currently in circula-
tion and warn against disclosing them to others. This strategy creates secret
stores of unused names and carries the disadvantage of allowing the links be-
tween names and places to attenuate. A second strategy avoids this problem but
appears to be at odds with previous Arosi practice. The missionary ethnogra-
pher Charles E. Fox (1924:179) noted, and older Arosi likewise stated to me,
that in the past names could only be re-used when no living person bore them.
Now, however, lineages are attempting “to bring back” their personal names by
bestowing them on their children even when non-lineage relatives with those
names are still living. As a result, Arosi are occasionally puzzled why other peo-
ple have given a child a name already in use, and such situations lead them to
suppose that there is no logic governing the way others are naming their chil-
dren. Rather than a sign of the breakdown of Arosi logic, however, this abro-
gation of naming convention is, I suggest—together with the physical and nar-
rative manipulation of sacred sites—part of a cosmologically informed Arosi
response to a socially and morally evacuated postcolonial landscape.
Ethnographers and historians have observed that the arrival of European ex-
plorers, missionaries, and structures of domination in colonial spaces can pre-
cipitate a perceived return to an imagined primordial condition or state of chaos
(Bonnemaison 1994; Lattas 1998; Noyes 1992; Williams 1986:chs. 7–9). This
insight may be brought into productive correlation with the anthropological
meta-cosmology outlined above. Colonial and postcolonial contexts, according
to this meta-cosmology, are particularly radical, concentrated, and far-reaching
instances of the processes of movement, exchange, domination, and coopera-
tion that continuously shape human relations and sustain the normal chaos of
hybridity. As such, colonial and postcolonial situations (or conditions of glob-
alization) highlight a potential practical nexus between the normal chaos of hy-
bridity and the—often very different—models of chaos prevalent in particular
neighborhoods. In this conjuncture of chaoses, differences between chaos as the
confusion of categories and the situationally available models of chaos with
which historical processes of hybridization may engage are necessarily relevant
to analyses of any ensuing reordering activities.
The forms of renewed matrilineal place-making in Arosi today clearly illus-
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trate this principle. A long-term effect of colonialism has been a perceived re-
turn of Arosi coastal land to a chaotic primordial state antithetical to order, fig-
ured in a variety of Arosi idioms as empty space. It is this perception of an un-
derlying problematic spatial vacuity that, despite the physical presence of
people on the land, is inspiring the activities that are quietly configuring mul-
tiple incompatible matrilineal territories along the Arosi coastline. Although ac-
curately understood as redoubled efforts at order reproduction, these activities
do not aim to redefine confused categories. Rather, they reference Arosi rep-
resentations of an ongoing transition between two contrastive aspects of pri-
mordiality: one pertaining to ultimate ancestral origins in separate previously
uninhabited spaces, the other pertaining to the generation of truly human ma-
trilineages through processes of place-making.
An Arosi vision of primordial spatial vacuity may be inferred from a variety
of narratives that describe how the mythic progenitors of Arosi matrilineages
arose autochthonously and independently around the island of Makira. Some
matrilineages, for example, claim that their ancestors were animate rocks
formed with the island; others say that they originated from the daughters of
snakes; another narrates descent from a female wondrously born from a dead
mother; another sees itself as the progeny of a supernatural female that emerged
from a well; and two lineages trace themselves to different instances of con-
gress between two species of quasi-human island beings. Arosi say that these
earliest ancestors were not yet “true people” (inoni mora). True people, orga-
nized into true matrilineages, came into being only when the different types of
ancestral beings entered into reproductive relations that prefigured matrilineage
exogamy. Prior to their connections, these pre-human categories anticipated in
their heterogeneity the essential diversity of Arosi matrilineages. But unlike the
matrilineages to which they gave rise, these categories first came into being in
static asocial purity at sites that, although discrete from one another, were so-
cial vacuums.
Just as these pre-matrilineal categories did not yet enjoy productive relations
with one another, they were likewise not yet connected to the specific domains
that would become their descendants’ lineage territories. Although understood
to have been somewhere on Makira—such as a well in the bush or a village of
rock people—at the moment of spontaneous ancestral emergence, each point
of ultimate origin was not yet a true place. Spatial analogues to the pre-matri-
lineal categories, these primordial no-places—not yet situated in a history of
ancestral words and deeds—were merely potential places. They became actu-
al named places, incorporated within distinct lineage territories, only when the
forebears of incipient matrilineages moved out from them, shaping extents of
land around and beyond them through actions that brought both the matrilin-
eages and their specific territories into being.
Distinct in style and content from tales of ultimate origins, genealogically or-
dered accounts of first advent in a particular area of land also present a vision
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of primordial chaos as vacuity. Such accounts emphasize that, prior to the time
of initial incursion, the land in question was empty and had no identity as a
place. A commonly held principle of first occupancy, according to which “the
land is the land of the lineage that arrived first,” presupposes a pre-social ge-
ography that has not been transformed by the place-making activities of any
other agents. In the words of some Arosi, this pre-social state is the unsettled
and unused “virgin forest” (wabu) that their lineage ancestors were the first to
clear (cf. Fox 1924:301).16
The place-making aspect of Arosi primordiality is, by contrast, a dynamic as-
pect consisting in practices that fuse matrilineages with unique territories and
promote inter-lineage relations. Genealogical lineage narratives recount how
the children in each generation of a nascent matrilineage spread out from the
abodes of their parents, extending their presence over terrain that thereby be-
came their lineage territory. As these ancestors moved into the land, they en-
gaged in a repertoire of place-making activities: they founded new settlements,
enshrined their dead, invested the land with tabus, innovated and recycled per-
sonal names attached to locales, and planted nut trees and gardens. They be-
came one with their land, shaping it and being shaped in return into a true ma-
trilineage with an exclusively emplaced past (cf. Coppet 1985). Because of this
mutually constitutive relationship among a lineage, its land, and its dead, land
that is unmodified and has received no dead is like a void or black hole that
threatens to consume a lineage’s identity (cf. Guidieri 1980:62). Empty space
must, therefore, be claimed from this pre-social condition and made into hu-
manized places. To humanize a space in this way is to become auhenua there.
At the same time, place-making primordiality encompasses the earliest inter-
actions among emergent matrilineages. As a necessary component of becom-
ing auhenua in their territories, lineage forebears welcomed in-marrying
women, granted the use of gardening land, nut trees, and even lineage-owned
personal names to non-lineage relatives, and settled strangers in their midst.
Arosi society is thus envisioned as having taken shape within place-making pri-
mordiality as a series of spatially discrete multi-lineage aggregates, each bound
together “under the ruling shadow” (marungi) of an auhenua lineage in its land.
In sum, a transition from the primordiality of ultimate origins to place-mak-
ing primordiality is necessary for the construction of a socio-cosmic totality.
This transition, in fact, inheres in multiple simultaneous cosmogonic process-
es that, by their nature, cannot be definitively accomplished but must be pur-
sued continuously for their ordering benefits to remain in effect. These process-
es graph perpendicular axes of generative relationships that intersect at, bring
into being, and come to depend on, matrilineage territories. The processes that
anchor matrilineages in particular places constitute a vertical axis, while the
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contexts, see, for example, Burt 1994:24–25; Coppet 1985:80; J. Fox 1997; Keesing 1992:
23–25.
concurrent processes that forge productive and reproductive relations among
them constitute a horizontal axis. Moreover, the structure of this dual-axis Arosi
cosmogony yields practical consequences: the vertical grounding of matrilin-
eages in their lands is indispensable to the formation of auhenua lineage iden-
tities, and auhenua lineage identities are the necessary preconditions for viable
social relations among matrilineages. There is a problematic tension, however,
between the two aspects of Arosi primordiality. Whereas the logic of ultimate
origins allows multiple matrilineages to claim autochthonous status by virtue
of spontaneous appearance at separate potential places without coming into
conflict, the logic of place-making introduces the possibility that more than one
matrilineage will claim to have moved into and established a relationship with
the same geographical space, situating a single shrine, nut tree, or name-gov-
erned locale in different matrilineal territories and narratives. The potential for
mutually disqualifying constructions of space, it seems, accompanies this way
of coming into being in the land as a form of cosmologically ordered socio-spa-
tial disorder.
Once discerned, the Arosi cosmogonic transition from one aspect of primor-
diality to another renders the motivation behind the present efflorescence of
coastal auhenua identities apparent. Without grounded auhenua matrilineages,
Arosi socio-cosmic order reverts to a chaos of vacuity. But, wherever land is
seen to be empty of auhenua, Arosi cosmic and social order abhors such a vac-
uum and seeks to fill it. Matrilineages cannot easily maintain their identities
without ancestral emplacement, and they struggle to find a foundation for prop-
er relations with one another without the center of gravity that an auhenua ma-
trilineage in its land provides. At any given place, someone has to be auhenua
in order for Arosi to achieve satisfactory cosmos and society there.
It thus transpires that, even as the postcolonial intensification of chaos as hy-
bridity undermines the anchored auhenua identities necessary for locality re-
production, it precipitates an experience of chaos as vacuity that is, by contrast,
especially conducive to the formation of such identities. The attitudes and as-
sumptions prevalent in everyday Arosi discourse—the frequent assertion that
the auhenua of the coast are dead, the reiteration that the present coastal Arosi
have come from elsewhere, the ambiguous nature of ancestral powers in a
Christian context, and uncertainty regarding the history of the coastal land—
converge to foster a virtual return to the condition of ultimate origins in which
land is conceptualized as empty and available to be shaped and socialized by
the activities of latter-day matrilineage ancestors.17
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17 Rhys Jones’ (1985:207) representation of the reaction of Frank Gurrmanamana, an Australian
Aborigine from Arnhem Land, to the city of Canberra provides a parallel case. To the eyes of Gurr-
manamana, “[h]ere was a land empty of religious affiliation; there were no wells, no names of the
totemic ancestors, no immutable links between land, people and the rest of the natural and super-
natural worlds. Here was just a vast tabula rasa, cauterised of meaning . . . in his own words ‘this
country bin lose ‘im Dreaming.’ . . . This land and its people therefore were analogous to the state
The coexistence of competing matrilineal constructions of space in Arosi re-
mains out of focus in its lived details, however, if regarded only from the ana-
lytical distance of an anthropological cosmology that sees it primarily as the re-
sult of attempts to reinvent difference under conditions of normal or intensified
hybridity. When grounded also in an appreciation of what constitutes a condi-
tion contrary to order among Arosi, the methods of matrilineal place-making
and their conflicting results come into relief as processes of order production
specific to a colonially mediated realization of a particular vision of chaos—
that of primordial vacuity. If postcolonial hybridity is the encompassing con-
text of conflicting Arosi efforts at place-making, hybridity itself is not the im-
mediate problem. It is not the case that uncertainty resides at the level of who
belongs to which matrilineage. The matrilineal categories are clear, but empty
land cannot embody them as such and give them agency as the social and spa-
tial centers of neighborhoods. Rather than employing techniques of differ-
entiation to sort out their lineage-cum-land identities, therefore, Arosi are re-
sponding to the perceived reversion of their coastal land to primordial vacuity
with a variety of practices and discourses informed by the actions of ancestral
pioneers. The construction of shrines, the incorporation of existing shrines into
lineage narratives, and the reclamation of lineage-specific personal names are
only three of several possible renewals of ancestral activity through which pre-
sent-day lineage representatives are anchoring themselves in otherwise lifeless,
meaningless, and potentially alienable land. Experience of one type of chaos
(hybridity) has activated representations of another (vacuity) and proliferated
new transformations of the order-promoting practices appropriate to the latter.
chaos as obstruction and the sacrifice 
of “blocked bodies” in burundi and rwanda
I have presented an analysis of chaotic vacuity in Arosi in support of the pro-
posal that the meta-cosmology embedded in current anthropological theory
should be coordinated with attention to the models of chaos and order produc-
tion available to the imaginations of subjects in their distinctive situations. To
reinforce this point with reference to another model of chaos—that of physical
obstruction—I juxtapose two independent analyses of late twentieth-century
violence in Burundi and Rwanda. Applying the meta-cosmology of anthropo-
logical theory to the 1972 massacres of Hutu by Tutsi in Burundi, Appadurai
(1998) offers a reading of these atrocities that, I suggest, casts them as acts of
neo-cosmogonic dismemberment in response to hybridity. Tracing out the sym-
bolism of a cosmology shared by Hutu and Tutsi in both Burundi and Rwanda,
Taylor (1999) interprets the comparable Rwandan Hutu on Tutsi killings of
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of all the world once in some time before the Dreaming, before the great totemic Ancestral Beings
strode across it, naming the places and giving it meaning. Viewed from this perspective, the Can-
berra of the geometric streets, and the paddocks of the six-wire fences were places not of domesti-
cated order, but rather a wilderness of primordial chaos.”
1994, as well as the earlier Burundi massacres, as the sacrifice of “blocked bod-
ies” designed to restore the orderly flow of life-giving forces and substances
within the body politic. Neither author appears aware of the other’s interpreta-
tion, but they are complementary rather than competing. Together they shed
maximum light on the meaning of violence in this central African context and
show how the universal impetus to order presumed in the meta-cosmology of
theory can be mediated in practice through the symbolism of a particular cos-
mology.
In a comparative study of “vivisectionist violence” among former intimates
under conditions of globalization, Appadurai (1998) tests a hypothesis that
there is a correlation between increased uncertainty regarding ethnic identities
and an upsurge in ethnic violence. He takes as one test case the violence per-
petrated by Tutsi against Hutu in Burundi during the early 1970s as described
in survivors’ oral testimonies and analyzed by Liisa Malkki (1995). Hutu and
Tutsi share what Malkki (1995:78–95) terms “body maps,” sets of physical
markers that enable them to identify each other (e.g., Hutu bear an “M” in the
lines on their palms; Tutsi have straight calves while Hutu have rounded ones;
Tutsi have black gums while Hutu have pink; Tutsi are tall, etc.). Drawing on
Mary Douglas’ thesis that the body is universally a microcosm of the categor-
ical distinctions relevant to particular cosmologies, Appadurai (1998:231) ar-
gues that the violence enacted on Hutu bodies by Tutsi was, in part, an enraged
response to the failure of real bodies accurately to display these marks of dis-
tinction. Under the conditions of postcoloniality, the dividing lines between
these ethnic categories had become intolerably blurred and could be restored
only by opening ambiguous bodies up to exploratory light and gaze. Conform-
ing to a logic that may, Appadurai (1998:232, 233) speculates, be operative in
widely different contexts, the chaos of hybridity manifested in uncertain ethnic
identities inspired acts of dismemberment as the means “to stabilize,” “to elim-
inate flux,” and “to establish the parameters” of otherness. Butchery served the
neo-cosmogonic function of restoring order by separating pure categories out
of a chaotic mix.
Appadurai’s analysis is compelling as far as it goes, but he is aware that it
does not account for “the quasi-ritual order, the attention to detail, the speci-
ficity of bodily violation, the systematicity of the forms of degradation”
(1998:243) that Malkki’s consultants describe. Although seeming to credit
Malkki’s “body maps” with the power to explain “the specific ways in which
Hutu men and women were killed”—including methods involving impalement
along the anus to head or vagina to head axis, forced incest, and forced endo-
cannibalism between mother and fetus—Appadurai (1998:230–31) concedes
that “[i]t remains to draw out the link between the mapped body of the ethnic
other and the peculiar and specific brutalities” in question. “[A]n additional in-
terpretive frame” is required, he concludes, but offers only “surplus rage” as the
missing ingredient that somehow “makes sense” of these details (1998:243). At
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most, Appadurai’s correlation of uncertainty with vivisectionist violence makes
sense of the Burundi massacres only at the grossest level of cutting open and
apart as techniques for achieving distinctions with “dead certainty.”
Taylor’s work provides the additional interpretive frame capable of supple-
menting Appadurai’s contribution with a clearer focus on the “routinized sym-
bolic schemes of nightmarish cruelty” (Malkki 1995:92) encountered in Bu-
rundi and Rwanda. Citing Malkki, Taylor (1999:104–5) points out that, despite
gestures toward the need for symbolic analysis of the “techniques of cruelty”
that were “already meaningful, already mythico-historical” to Tutsi and Hutu
(Malkki 1995:94), she attempts no such analysis, and the “body maps” she iden-
tifies give little hermeneutic purchase on these techniques. What is needed, Tay-
lor argues, is attention to the recursive symbolism of a Rwanda-Burundian cos-
mology according to which all things depend on the continuous circulation of
life-giving forces and substances mediated by relationships of reciprocal ex-
change. Central to this symbolism is the microcosmic body, assimilated at once
to the natural order and the body politic as a conduit of vitality equally suscep-
tible to states of ordered flow and chaotic blockage. It is this “flow/blockage
dialectic” played out on the microcosmic body that best accounts, according to
Taylor, for some of the techniques of cruelty employed by Hutu and Tutsi in
their reciprocal exchanges of violence.
Returning to analyses elaborated in an earlier ethnography of the transfor-
mation of popular medicine in Rwanda, Taylor (1992; 1999) rehearses the mul-
tiple registers in which the symbolism of flow and blockage is legible: disease
and healing; sacral kingship and its rituals; a gift economy, especially as in-
stantiated by asymmetrical exchanges between patrons and clients; and con-
ceptualizations of local topography. Each of these registers represents forms of
continuous flow as conditions of life-giving order and forms of obstruction as
life-threatening chaos. Signs of order include bodily orifices and internal tracts
that are open, clear, and successfully engaged in ingestive, evacuative, and re-
productive functions; freely moving watercourses and navigable pathways; pa-
tron-client reciprocity; timely and adequate rainfall understood as celestial vi-
tality mediated to earth by the king. Conversely, signs of chaos include closed
bodily orifices and blocked internal tracts producing sickness and infertility;
clogged rivers and roadblocks; exploitation of patrons by clients; and drought
or famine indicative of a weak or corrupt ruler. This cosmology furthermore
comprehends the category of “blocked beings,” agents perceived to embody the
condition of chaotic obstruction. Among this class of beings are sorcerers who
inflict illness by causing blockages in other people’s bodies; enemies of the king
or even the king himself as an ambivalent figure able to control both flow and
blockage; and young girls who, although old enough for child bearing, lack de-
veloped breasts or have not yet begun to menstruate. In precolonial times, the
latter two exemplars of the blocked being category might be ritually sacrificed
for the health of the physical realm and the community. Such a being was not
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only blocked but blocking and needed to be eliminated like an internal ob-
struction from the social body.
Taylor’s study of Rwandan royal ideology and healing practices during the
1980s equipped him with a symbolic literacy that made the messages inscribed
on Tutsi bodies by Hutu in the 1990s decipherable. As several of the most hor-
rific techniques of cruelty perpetrated in Rwanda replicated those described by
Malkki’s Hutu consultants, Taylor (1999:146) also applies his interpretations
retrospectively to the 1972 violence in Burundi. In both contexts, the perpetra-
tors of genocide were casting their victims as blocked and blocking beings
whose existence threatened the body politic with the chaos of obstruction. Act-
ing in ways that made them analogous to the ancient king or popular healer, the
génocidaires appropriated the power to control and intervene in the processes
of flow and blockage through manipulation of their victims’bodies. Several no-
torious techniques of cruelty objectify a process whereby the victimizers first
contained their victims and inscribed on their bodies their blocked and block-
ing natures before killing them in order to remove this blockage and restore or-
dered flow. Impalement along the vertical axis of the digestive or reproductive
tract, for example, constitutes total occlusion of these conduits of vitality, ren-
dering the victim not only physically dead but symbolic of death as a state of
self-contained closure. Forced endo-cannibalism of an aborted fetus by its
mother likewise graphically displays the idea of a closed-circuit exchange, a
dead end. In cases of forced incest as well, the victims become icons of “mis-
directed flows” (Taylor 1999:141) that are internal to one family rather than ex-
ternal and interconnecting among many.
This hermeneutic of flow and blockage also enables Taylor to read addition-
al modes of atrocity documented only in Rwanda. Emasculation and debreast-
ing of Tutsi by Hutu in the Rwandan genocide emerge as further techniques for
the sacrificial representation of blocked beings whose life-giving fluids have
been stopped up. Perhaps the most pervasive techniques to which Taylor ap-
plies this hermeneutic, however, are the multiple modes of immobilization,
ranging from a superabundance of roadblocks in excess of the number required
to contain the fleeing Tutsi, to the cutting off of legs and feet, and the system-
atic slashing of Achilles tendons—even on the already infirm incapable of
flight. These forms of immobilization imposed a collective stasis on the whole
Tutsi category within the borders of Rwanda as a prelude to purging them from
the nation-state.
That the analyses of Taylor and Appadurai are not incompatible is evident
from Taylor’s recognition that, inasmuch as the conditions of flow and block-
age became assimilated, in the nationalism of the Hutu génocidaires of Rwan-
da, to the ethnicized categories Hutu and Tutsi, the chaos of hybridity between
these valorized categories was also at play, motivating “genocide aimed at re-
asserting the cosmic order of the Hutu state” (Taylor 1999:154). Clearly, in or-
der to purge the blocked and blocking category Tutsi from the body politic one
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must be able to separate Tutsi from Hutu, and Taylor acknowledges that the
“body maps” identified by Malkki were employed by Hutu against Tutsi in
Rwanda just as they had been by Tutsi against Hutu in Burundi. But the pri-
mary targets of the rage inspired by recalcitrant bodies and the chaos of hy-
bridity in Rwanda were, according to Taylor (1999:ch. 4), Tutsi women. Being
frequently the wives and mistresses of Hutu men and the “potential mothers of
ethnically anomalous children,” Tutsi women were “liminoid beings.” They
were doubly chaotic, simultaneously embodying the chaos of obstruction as
Tutsi and the chaos of hybridity as partners in miscegenation. Taylor reports
that, in addition to suffering the tortures already discussed, many Tutsi women
were also subjected to rape and sexual captivity, acts which Appadurai
(1998:239–40) suggests may be methods “to expose, penetrate, and occupy the
material form—the body—of the ethnic other” as part of a program of “pro-
ducing persons” as tokens of clear-cut ontological types. When brought to-
gether in this way, the meta-cosmological analysis of Appadurai and the cos-
mological analysis of Taylor bring the position of the Tutsi woman into its
fullest appalling focus. By a variety of symbolic means, the body of a Tutsi
woman was good to control, for to do so was to fight chaos on two fronts.
conclusion: comparative chaos and the uses of cosmology
Advocating a return to “Grand Theory” in anthropology “accompanied by a
critical politics,” Moore (1997) has forwarded postcolonialism as a useful com-
parative “concept-metaphor” in the pursuit of these allied objectives. Concept-
metaphors, she explains, are the necessary rubrics for cross-cultural study—
such as “the body,” “the self,” and “gender”—that can provide a nexus between
the universal and the particular and facilitate the linked production of theory
and ethnography. These rubrics are serviceable to this task because their mean-
ings are at once taken for granted and unspecifiable. As ideal constructs they
are “metaphors which have no adequate referents” (Moore 1997:140), and it is
therefore not possible to define them either univocally or exhaustively. An-
thropological understanding of particularities and the refinement of theoretical
models take place precisely when the gaps and misfits between these metaphors
and their referents are pried open and scrutinized. In adding postcolonialism to
the list of potential concept-metaphors, Moore advances a trope that asserts the
universality of hybridity in a globalizing world while acknowledging a spec-
trum of relative degrees of hybridity in actual experience. The concept-
metaphor postcolonialism thus seems to bear a trope within a trope, for its
salient characteristic, Moore (1997:132, 141–42) implies, is hybridity. This hy-
bridity is furthermore a species of chaos with a built-in praxis of order repro-
duction: “In order to know who I am, you must be different from me. We all
need histories, and their violent making and remaking is one consequence of
the kind of postcolonial space we inhabit” (1997:142). Building on the ratio-
nale and content of Moore’s proposal, I conclude with the suggestion that the
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ethnographic cases I have presented indicate an instructive gap between the
concept-metaphor postcolonialism—understood as the chaos of hybridity—
and the plurality of conceptualizations of chaos that inform practical order pro-
duction in particular contexts.
The methods of matrilineal emplacement in Arosi and the techniques of cru-
elty in Burundi and Rwanda warrant the promotion of chaos itself, which en-
compasses hybridity as one among many possible visions of disorder, as a com-
parative concept-metaphor in anthropological theorizing and the interpretation
of social practices. With its privileging of hybridity as the universal condition
of chaos, the meta-cosmology of contemporary theory fosters analyses of prac-
tices as responses to the disconcerting mixing and blurring of categories. 
Although Appadurai’s work on vivisectionist violence demonstrates the ex-
planatory benefits this specification of chaos can have, these benefits can be
enhanced, I submit, by also asking: with what other visions of chaos does the
chaos of hybridity articulate in history? Even within the wider context of chaot-
ic hybridity, glossed as postcoloniality, postmodernity, or globalization, people
continue to experience chaos as they know it. Hybridity is not the only model
of chaos, and re-parsing is not the only technique for order making. Further-
more, as in Rwanda, social agents may be drawing on more than one model of
chaos as they struggle to refashion order. Accordingly, we need to allow a less
prescriptive meta-cosmology of the universal, ongoing, and multiple transitions
from chaos to order to elicit this plurality of chaoses, not obscure it under a sin-
gle master trope. But the existence of a significant gap or misfit between hy-
bridity and the other models of chaos evident in contexts such as Arosi and
Rwanda-Burundi need not lead to a particularist paralysis that leaves these
models of chaos incommensurable (cf. Moore 1997:134–35). Rather, the sub-
stitution of a more polysemous notion of chaos in place of hybridity in current
anthropological cosmology strengthens its universalist claims while mandating
a comparative study of chaos that seeks to understand how particular models
of primordiality or the breakdown of order represent both disorder and its like-
ly remedies. This is only to take history seriously as having produced different
visions of chaos that are, after all, still obstacles to mutual transparency but nev-
ertheless comprehensible as manifestations of a universal dialectic.
And here, a final issue obtrudes on this discussion. If anthropological meta-
cosmology claims that human ontology predisposes us to engage in multiple,
continuous, and imperfect strategies for bringing order out of chaos, it needs
also to assert that this recognition of the eternal return of chaos is not a fatalis-
tic acceptance that some modes of order production will be violent. Recently,
influential interpreters of religious cosmologies have been criticized for aes-
theticizing visions of life born out of death and cosmic cycles of periodic de-
struction and rebirth as necessary to a supra-moral dialectic (Wasserstrom
1999). Another reason, then, to acknowledge that anthropological theory en-
tails a meta-cosmology that encrypts pseudo-mythic narratives is to guard
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against a similar tendency, or even its inadvertent appearance. When reckoning
with models of chaos and their possible practical ramifications, social scientists
must be clear that forms of order production are not morally neutral, and our
flirtations with the renovative potentialities of hybridity must reject any implicit
nihilistic attraction to order dissolution. All visions of chaos raise serious ethi-
cal questions about what ought to constitute proper order, and many seem to
encode praxes susceptible to abhorrent deformation.18 While order production
may be necessary, not all forms of order production are acceptable and none is
inevitable. A return to Grand Theory in anthropology accompanied by a criti-
cal politics enjoins, therefore, not only the breakdown of essentialized di-
chotomies between Self and Other, but a project of imagining cosmologically
satisfying alternatives to order by atrocity.
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